Volume 61

Issue 1

Article 16

December 1958

Real Property--Oil and Gas Leases--Right of Lessor Against
Sublessee
L. B. S.
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
L. B. S., Real Property--Oil and Gas Leases--Right of Lessor Against Sublessee, 61 W. Va. L. Rev. (1958).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol61/iss1/16

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
free him of his obligation to the donee, who may have relied heavily
upon the gift. The minority view should become the majority view
in the foreseeable future.
D. V. W.
REAL PRoPERTY-OiL AND GAS LEASES-RIGiTs OF LESSOn
AGANST SUBLESSE.-PaintiffS leased certain oil and gas lands to X.

By mesne assignments, B acquired X's rights under these leases, all of
which were recorded. In 1932, in compromise of a forfeiture suit
then being prosecuted by the plaintiff, the plaintiff and B entered
into a written modification agreement providing for an increase in
the amount of the royalties due the plaintiff. The modification
agreement was never recorded. In 1936 B subleased to the defendant and the defendant agreed to pay B such rents and royalties as B
might be chargeable with under the leases and agreements through
which B derived title. The terms of this sublease were substantially
reiterated in a new lease between B and the defendant in 1946. The
defendant was sued by the plaintiff for the excess in royalties provided for in the unrecorded agreement over the royalties provided
for in the recorded leases. Held, where a sublessee agrees with the
lessee to assume the obligations of the parent lease, the lessor has a
right of action as a creditor beneficiary on that contract regardless of
the recording statutes. Shearer v. United Carbon Co., 103 S.E.2d
883 (W. Va. 1958).
There is one matter that has led to considerable difficulty in an
analysis of this case as reported. The majority opinion mentions at
one point in their decision the fact that the defendant had actual notice of the unrecorded modification agreement prior to the signing of
the 1946 lease, under which recovery for the excess royalties was
sought le dissenting opinion states most emphatically that "the
defendant was not a party to such agreement, had no notice thereof,
or of any fact putting it on inquiry." The conflict thus presented by
the majority and minority opinions cannot be reconciled under the
limited facts of this case. In spite of the conflict of factual statements, the issue with which this comment is most concerned is
squarely raised. It is: is a modification agreement with respect to
mineral royalties within the coverage of the West Virginia recording
statutes?
The dissenting opinion was based on the contention that the
modification agreement was one necessarily covered by the record-
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ing statutes. W. VA. CODE ch.40, art. 1, §§ 8,9 (Michie 1955). The
dissent, quoting section 8 states it thus: ".... any contract in writing

made in respect to real estate or goods ... or any contract in writing
made for the conveyance or sale of real estate, or an interest or term
therein of more than five years, or any other interest or term... under which the whole or any part of the corpus of the estate may be
taken, destroyed... shall from the time it is duly admitted to record,
be, as against creditors and purchasers, as valid as if the contract
were a deed.... " If, as contended by the dissent, the modification

agreement was a "contract in respect to real estate" it clearly should
have been recorded to have been enforceable against the defendant
as a subsequent purchaser for value without notice. The first part of
section 8 in its full context, however, provides: "Any contract in
writing made in respect to real estate or goods and chattels in considerationof marriage...."(Emphasis added.) The dissent has, by
omitting the qualifying phrase of this first part of the section, interpreted that section in so broad and comprehensive a manner as to
exceed the true purpose of that section. A primary rule of statutory
construction is that a statute should be interpreted so as to give effect
to all of its words. Herald v. Surber, 83 W. Va. 785, 99 S.E. 187
(1919). Clearly then, it is not any or every "contract in respect to
real estate" that is covered by the recording statutes.
The dissent also stated that it was clear that the modification
agreement would fall within the provision governing contracts under
which the whole or any part of the corpus of the estate might be
taken. W. VA. CoDE. ch. 40, art. 1, § 8 (Michie 1955). The second
part of that section provides, however, that: ".... or any contract in

writing made for the conveyance or sale of real estate, or any interest
or term therein of more than five years, or any interest or term therein, of any duration, under which the whole or any part of the corpus
of the estate may be taken... shall from the time it is duly admitted
to record, be, as against creditors and purchasers, as valid as if the
contract were a deed...
In his treatise, Mr. Summers states that, "in all jurisdictions
where the question has been raised, it has been held that oil and gas
leases are conveyances affecting title to land within the provisions of
the recording acts ..

. ."

SUADMrMs, O.

Ain GAs § 281 (2d ed.

1927). The problem in this case is not concerned with the lease itself, but solely with the modification agreement providing for increased royalties. It is noted that not every contract "under which
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the whole or any part of the corpus of the estate may be taken" is
within the scope of the recording statute, but that the second part of
section 8 states that contracts "for the conveyance or sale of real
estate" shall be so covered. W. VA. CODE ch. 40, art. 1, § 8 (Michie
1955). Unless the modification agreement were a sale or conveyance, it would then not fall within this section as read in its entirety.
The purpose of the agreement was to increase remuneration under the existing leases. A conveyance is a written instrument by
which the title to land is transferred from one person to another.
American Net & Twine Co. v. Mayo, 97 Va. 182, 33 S.E. 523 (1899).
A sale is an agreement between parties to transfer the rights of
property for a consideration. Tuggle v. Belcher, 104 W. Va. 178,
189 S.E. 653 (1927). To come within the recording statutes, the
modification agreement would have to have been a transfer from B
to the plaintiff of the right or title to a real property interest.
It is difficult to ascertain whether the lessee's interest under an
oil and gas lease is regarded as real or personal property in West
Virginia. In Haskell v. Sutton, 53 W. Va. 206, 44 S.E. 583 (1908),
it was held that the lease of oil and gas lands had the effect of a grant
of that part of the corpus of the land. In the case of Headley v.
Hoopengarner,60 W. Va. 626, 55 S.E. 744 (1906), the court said
that the ordinary oil and gas lease for a definite term was not a sale
of the oil and gas in place, and in effect was not a sale of any estate
in real property. In Harvey Coal & Coke Co. v. Dillon, 59 W. Va.
605, 53 S.E. 928 (1905), a taxation case, it was held that even where
the lease was to extend beyond its definite term for an additional
period until all the minerals should be removed, the lessee's interest
under the lease was but a chattel real, which is personal property.
In referring to the variances in these decisions, SUMns, op. cit.
supra § 157, states that, "The West Virginia court seems to have
been more indefinite ...

respecting the nature of the oil and gas

lessee's interest than the courts of most states." In view of this fact,
it would be only on most insecure and tenuous grounds that the
modification agreement could be considered a conveyance or sale of
a real property interest.
One instance wherein the modification agreement would be
within the coverage of the recording statutes, would be if the defendant had not had actual or inquiry notice of the modification
agreement. There is no question but that the purchaser of an inter-
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est in oil and gas leases is a purchaser for value within the meaning
of the recording statutes. Carter Oil Co. v. McQuigg, 112 F.2d 275
(7th Cir. 1940). The courts are in accord that purchasers of real
property interests under oil and gas leases are entitled to rely on the
record title, and are not subject to the secret equities of third persons.
Angichiodo v. Cerami,28 F. Supp. 720 (W.D. La. 1939). Though
subsequent purchasers are clearly bound by the record title, it would
seem that they would not be bound by alterations in respect to the
property where the record title was not changed to conform with
such a modification.
With the above possible exception, a consideration of the recording statutes in their full context makes it manifest that there
would be great doubt that the modification agreement would be
covered thereunder. This result could be reached only if the West
Virginia court should regard the lessee's interest as a real property
interest. There is clearly some doubt that they would so hold. The
dissents deficient quotation of the recording statute leads not only to
an erroneous oversimplification of the law, but also to a most conf using analysis of the position of this case in regard to the recording
statutes. The conflict in factual statements in the two opinions renders a firm resolution of this case in the mind of the reader extremely difficult and speculative.
L. B. S.
WoRxni's COwmFESATiON-MENTAL An EmOTONAL ATrrTuE
OF EMPLOYEE CONSEwmu
FAcEroR iN BxcovERY.-Appeal from a

workmen's compensation award to D who suffered a heart attack
which, according to expert medical testimony, could have been
caused by the mental and emotional strain of her job, coupled with
her pre-existing hypertension. She later died. Held, that where an
employee's disability or illness is aggravated by mental and emotional strain on the job leading to resulting injury or death, the injury is
compensable even in the absence of direct physical activity as a factor contributing to the disability. Ins. Dep't of Mississippi v. Dinsmore, 102 So. 2d 691 (Miss. 1958).
The principal case represents a departure from the prevailing
line of authority in compensation cases for two reasons: it considers
the worker's mental and emotional attitude toward, and the emotional demands of his job, then allows recovery in the absence of direct physical activity as a factor in the injury.
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